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THE MACHINE-AGE MIND AND LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Like modern builders of a Tower of Babel, we today are
engaged in the erection of a machine culture that may be our
undoing. The dominance of the machine is perhaps the out-
standing characteristic of present-day civilization; the idea of
progress probably the reigning conception.1 Our dependence on
the machine is very great and appears to be becoming greater.
Reliance on it is so complete that fanciful predictions have been
made that eventually the machine would destroy our civiliza-
tion.2 The presence of the machine has created innumerable
problems in industry, in the relations between sovereign States,
in the family, in the distribution of population, its birth and
death rate, in the growth of crime, and in the field of legal
relationships. The urge to find markets for mass production
of the machine has created a host of legal problems, some socially
good and others socially bad. The effect of the machine in
solving many problems due to space has created a network of
relationships of interdependence and solidarity of national and
international action and viewpoint which no longer permit any
nation to live unto itself.3 Consequences of machine supremacy
cannot now be envisaged, but the future is certain to bring about
numerous transformations in political alignments, birth of con-
stitutional doctrines, and changes in structural industry that
will be far reaching.4 The American Bar must understand and
appreciate the philosophy of these developments in order both
to lead and to guide the forces of machine culture; the judiciary
must be in tune with machine-age symphony in order to pre-
' "The Common Law and the Idea of Progress," 10 American Bar
Assn. Journal, p. 459.
' Such books as Spengler's "Decline of the West," Austin Freeman's
"Social Decay and Regeneration," and Butler's "Erewhon," illustrate
this type of thought. And see further, E. M. Forster's work on "The
Development of Mechanics."
' Nicholas M. Butler, "Development of an International Mind," 9
American Bar Assn. Journal, p. 520.
4 Discussion at present relating to a "Five-year Plan for American
Industry," with an elaborate machinery of master planning and zoning,
is symptomatic of a possible trend in American industry; the saine is
true of corporate agriculture. Cf. Stuart Chase, "Harnessing the Wild
Horses of Industry," Atlantic Monthly, June, 1931, and ibid., "A Ten-
Year Plan for America," Harper's June, 1931, and see Morrow Mayo.
"Goodbye, Wheat Farmer," American Mercury, June, 1931.
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elude discordant notes in decisions that are not in harmony
with its furtherance. For law is in part the ordered control by
the State of this entire process of machine evolution for the
public welfare; and, if development of machine control over our
activities is inevitable, as now appears, legal rules, doctrines, and
institutions must cooperate, not obstruct, in the unfolding web.
INDICTMENT OF THE AGE OF MECHANICAL CONTRIVANCES
Before discussing probable effects of machine culture upon
the law, it may be well to pause and to consider the indictment
urged against our machine civilization or that of mechanical con-
trivances.5 Our attitude toward these charges will play a role
deciding whether or not machine culture and its by-products
should be welcomed or repelled by legal means. If the machine
has dominated over man, we have a materialism in which there
is little room for anything but mechanism and a machine mind;
if man is still master, our machine age, with its asserted evils,
may be only a passing phase of human existence; and human
ingenuity with legal aid, will find some means of circumventing
complete mechanistic dominance.
Technological civilization, it has been said, is standardizing
life in such fashion that man is losing his personality, being lost
in the multitude, with few, if any, original ideas.6  Individual
greatness in the fine arts is declared to be a rarity; human
genius is all absorbed with machine culture problems, where
rewards are great in that machine supremacy is being furthered.
Moreover, machine civilization is said to have a deadening
monotony about it, creating in the workers performing routine
and highly specialized tasks, a dullness, a blankness, of appre-
ciation of higher sentiments and aspirations.7 The outer life,
the life of machine activity, is charged with killing the inner
" The indictment of mechanical civilization is well presented, but at
the same time challenged, by Dr. Alberto Pirelli, in "Lights and
Shades of Modern Mechanical Civilization" (International Chamber
of Commerce address, Washington, D. C., May 7, 1931).
8 Charles W. Wood, "The Second Industrial Revolution and the In-
dividual," vol. cxlix of The Annals of the American Academy of Pol.
& Soc. Sci., pp. 120 et seq.
' Such books as Arthur Pound's "The Iron Man," and Dubreuil's
"Robots or Men?" discuss various phases of this tendency. Stuart
Chase, In his recent article on this subject, has shown that in America,
out of 42,000,000 people gainfully employed, only about 13% do so-
called monotonous or robot work (supra, note 5).
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life, the life of contemplation, of philosophy, of artistic tempera-
ment. The uniformity of modern technical culture, it is
asserted, is causing the disappearance of individualism, by
reducing the range of choice and tending to level differences in
taste and expression. The omnipresence of radio, the telephone,
the clamor and uproar of city streets, the noises of industry and
transportation, tend to drown out contemplation and solitude,
with consequent disappearance of new and original thinldng.
The tempo of the age is one of jazz, not of higher symphonic
idealism; one of superficiality and display, not of thoroughness
and modesty. Spiritual values are subordinated to the quest of
the material.8
That the balance between the physical and the spiritual has
been overthrown must be admitted, and that the technical
machine age has evils cannot be denied. But in my judgment,
this disequilibrium will be only temporary, and from this cradle
of relationships there will probably emerge a new and better
intellectual and spritual progeny. Every age must pay its
share toward the betterment of the next, and sometimes the pay-
ment exacted is harsh. On the other hand, strong defense can
be made of machine culture, of the age of mechanical contriv-
ances, were there nothing else ahead. The machine has made
for greater leisure in that, in the words of one of its greatest
advocates, Henry Ford, it has "liberated man from brute
burdens and released energies to the upbuilding of his intel-
lectual and spiritual powers for conquests in the field of thought
and higher action." And the spiritual life of man is far from
dead; courage, tenacity, self-sacrifice, flashes of genius, noble
feats, have accompanied the development, and extension, of
machine culture. Labor-serving devices, as well as labor-saving
expedients, have given to the masses a standard of living, and a
comfort of existence, possible only to those who in earlier days
had numerous slaves to do their bidding. The average com-
bined animal and machine horse power per person in the United
States, the leading industrial nation in the world, in 1928, was
over seven, which was equivalent to one hundred and seventy-
five slaves, measured in terms of man power.9 Poverty, that
8 James B. Beck, "The Lost Sense of Values" (Commencement ad-
dress at Loyola University, Chicago, Ill. June 10, 1931).
'Walter Dill Scott, "The New Universe," ch. 1; also in a Prologue
to my "Cases on Industrial Law," pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
Tim MAcHnmE-AGE Mn AND LEAL DEvELoPmETS 419
universal monotony in ages past, may yet be gradually elimi-
nated as mechanism increases and cheapens production, shorten-
ing the working day, and giving ample time for satisfaction of
wants not possible in a non-machine age, where wages were low
and hours of employment long.10 If this should be the sole
accomplishment of the machine age, it would probably be worth
all it has thus far cost, in its effect, as a by-product, on our
mental and spiritual life. But mind is superior to any other
reality in our present existence, and this mind will dominate
machine culture, preserving its best features, and discarding
that which is bad. Human nature appears an unchangeable
element in a changing world, and this fact is of vital significance
in our attitude toward the indictments urged against machine
culture. However we may view these problems, machine civiliza-
tion is here to stay.
IS A MACHI-AGE MrND EvOLvING?
An important effect of this hegemony of machinery in our
modern life may be to create a "machine-age mind,"' 1 a collec-
tive corpus of conceptions shared by a large, if not a prevailing,
number, of persons, which mind may, without our conscious
perception, be affecting the law, its institutions, and its adminis-
tration. It is probably impossible to create conviction beyond
reasonable doubt that this "mind" (conceding its existence) has
been the sole factor, or even a prominent factor, in occasioning
certain movements or developments in the law. But, in the
words of Maitland, history is a "seamless web," so that in a
given social mind there is an intertwining of beliefs and forces
that interact upon one another in subtle ways, not discernible
without analysis of causes and effects and a probing beneath
appearances. Often in human experience inferences rest upon
slender premises; human reason must bridge the hiatus between
fact and unproved fact by means of reasonable deduction.1 2 The
11 Javitts & Wood, "Make Everybody Rich-Industry's New Goal,"
ch. 5.
2 Raymond B. Fosdlck is a leading exponent of such a "mind."
And see further, John Herman Randall, "Our Changing Civilization,"
ch. 2; and Walter Lippman, "A Preface to Morals," ch. 3.
""In the affairs of life, where much is often obscure, men have to
draw inferences of fact from slender premises. A plaintiff or claimant
must prove his case. The burden is upon him. But this does not mean
that he must demonstrate his case." Loreburn, L. C., in MarshaNl v.
Owners of S. S. "Wild Rose" (1910) A. C. 486.
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same may be true of the existence and influence of a machine-
age mind in its effect upon the law, its institutions, jurispru-
dence, developments, and tendencies. The presence of the
machine has created numerous problems not present before its
advent; there is a certain unique legal mind engaged in solving
these problems, and in the process law, as one mode of social
control, is variously affected.
Although the basis for this so-called machine-age mind is
largely theoretical, and without actual "judicial" proof such
as we lawyers very much desire, or not desire, as occasion may
require, nevertheless a brief in its behalf is substantially as fol-
lows: Mechanical horse-power and electrical energy dominate
our lives. We think in terms of ingot production, kilowatt
hours, and horse-power. The uniformity of output of the
machine is the main characteristic of the machine itself, in fact,
its very purpose. Identical types of automobiles, hats, shoes,
radios, household appliances and fashions, created by mass pro-
duction and owned by millions of people, may lead to a stand-
axdization of thought and viewpoint in other fields. Bertrand
Russell has raised the query whether we can have a machine
civilization without a mechanistic viewpoint in thoughts and
mental habits. Perhaps that is crediting or blaming the machine
too much, but men may tend to think alike if there is mass dis-
tribution of ideas, so feasible by means of the radio in millions
of homes, as well as by identity of output of the machine through
quantity production. Individual self-assertion may be subordi-
nated to collective viewpoint; the lone voices may be given scant
credence. The advertising value of a unique or antique display
or idea forcefully brings home to the mind how the unusual
attracts attention in an age of sameness. The natural instinct
for solidarity can become a righteous majority, with hallowed
authority; sameness or uniformity of articles in use all about
us tend to a similarity in thought and action; range of choice is
narrowed; action is restricted. These are declared to be some of
the elements of the so-called machine-age mind, a crystallized
body of conceptions drawn from machine dominance and
machine symbols.
But in the realm of ideas, standardization will mean death
and stagnation; hence, if there is a machine-age mind we must
be on our guard not to be completely controlled by it. But in
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my judgment, the machine age itself has created an antidote as
a partial saving factor, namely, the spirit of inventiveness, the
quest for ever new and better ways of accomplishing objectives
of machine control and development. This spirit tends to make
for experiment with new ideas and reception of new views, at
least so far as greater efficiency of the machine is concerned. It
has a potential danger in that ideas that might seek to limit
machine development, production of goods, or marketing of its
products, are regarded as of doubtful value, and may be sought
to be repressed. Thus a cross-current of inventiveness may'
neutralize a tendency toward uniformity of viewpoint that the
machine's presence may tend to foster. Moreover, the influence
of the general idea of progress cooperates to this same end.
ADVENT OF THE MACHINE AND LEGAL CHANGES
The machine's presence has affected our ways of doing and
looking at things and solving our problems, and from this
development it has been asserted, as indicated, that we have
developed a machine-age mind. However this may be, it is
quite obv'iously true that the machine itself has been the
progenitor of numerous economic and legal changes; all admit
this because it cannot be disputed. In the labor world, the
machine's presence has caused innumerable industrial injuries,
disease, and death. It has compelled labor to organize in self-
protection against the machine's universal or continuous use, in
securing shorter working hours and the cry for the five-day
week. In industry it has meant mass production, which at
present has meant over-production, due to a variety of world-
wide causes, but in part to a faulty system of distribution.13
The machine has led to concentration of capital in few hands,
despite the more recent widespread stock ownership by the
public; to the location of dense population in small areas, to.
nation-wide chains of various types for the better disposal of the
machine's products.1 4 In the political and financial realm, the
1'Hon. Rufus Dawes, "The Machine and Unemployment" (Com-
mencement address, Northwestern University, June 15, 1931).
1 
"From a technical point of view we are today in a twilight zone
between an old machine industry that rested on steam power and, a
new machine industry that will rest on electric power. Between the
two there Is a difference as wide as the world. In a machine indusrty
resting on steam power, the worker must go to the power; for steam
Is stationary motive power. In a machine industry resting on electric
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machine has caused wars, alliances, armaments, and heavy taxa-
tion; in the United States, machinery and electric power, know-
ing no artificial political boundaries, are tending to break down
the semi-sovereign position of the constituent States, perhaps in
future making them merely administrative units for federal
purposes, or, if this is too extreme a view, restricting them more
and more to purely local affairs while gradually enlarging the
orbit of federal powers. Are our component States to become
in future mere "geographical expressions"?
Shrinkage in earthly space which comes from employment
of machinery gives us a solidarity of outlook and sentiment that
tend to break down sectionalism and parochialism. The speed
of the machine age has a tendency to create a nervous impa-
tience with methodical or slower methods of attaining objectives,
with the laborious processes of research and thoroughness, with
painstaking investigations and calm reflections, unless it be in
the laboratory of the physical and natural sciences. Our age of
hurry and pressure gives rise to poorly drafted and ill-con-
sidered, and perhaps unwise, laws, making our courts much
additional work in overthrowing such legislation on the claim
of unconstitutionality or construing it in accordance with sense
and reason. The struggle for existence, not only in industry
but in all walks of life, under highly competitive conditions and
in the employment of machinery, has caused heart failure to
become the leading factor in the death rate, raising numerous
legal problems. The legal profession is already acquainted with
a medico-legal terminology, in workmen's compensation, and
in torts.
Organization and centralization in government, industry,
and in the labor world, for the control of the machine and its
products, for reaching markets, for raising capital for expansion
and exploitation of resources, for self-protection of the workers,
have become watchwords of the machine age.' 5 We think in
power, the power can be taken to the worker, for electricity is trans-
missible motive power. A machine industry resting on steam power
must centralize; a machine industry resting on electric power may
decentralize." Glenn Frank, "Business and Politics in the American
Future," vol. cxlix, The Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci.,
pp. 173 et seq.
"'Fry, L. 3., In Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23Q. B. D. 598, at p. 630, expressed a similar view; and so also did Carter,
J., in Kemp v. Division No. 241, in 255 Ill. 213, at pp. 235, 236.
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terms of efficient centralization, combination, and associational
activity; these are inevitable by-products of the machine's
presence. Whether or not government can, through anti-
combination laws, prevent these developments, seems doubtful;
perhaps these laws can act only as emergency brakes in future,
reaching only the most glaring types of illegality; perhaps they
will be jettisoned entirely as pressure of new problems for safe-
guarding industry and furthering it press for attention. But
these networks of national and international organizations tend
to dampen individualism, and to prevent experimentation along
new lines. The delicate balance which organization has set up
must not be upset by permitting innovations, for stabilization
of industry is more to be desired. Thus hyper-centralization
and super-organization may crush out individual effort, may
result in stereotyped thinking, may embalm certain views and
practices, all for sake of the machine and its supremacy. A
cradle of conservatism results; and the legal profession, as the
servant of this machine master, may itself be enslaved, and
thus fail in leadersh ip in general human progress. In fact, are
not the engineers and scientists already the real leaders of our
machine-age, rather than the lawyers?
THE URGE TO LEGAL UNIFORMITY
Perhaps it is impossible to indicate what, if any, legal
effects the machine, as contra-distinguished from the machine-
age mind, has originated; the two cooperating with each other
have, however, been responsible for certain developments. An
outstanding characteristic of present-day legal tendencies is the
passion for, and the movement toward, uniformity. Perhaps
the source of motivation is that of national consciousness. A
feeling that we are one nation, despite the peculiar structural
mold of federalism in which our national, state, and local gov-
ernments are cast; and that therefore there should be uniform
laws and decisions throughout the length and breadth of the
country. A more likely motive, however, or one cooperating
with that already suggested, is to be found in the presence of
the machine and its concomitants. The machine knows no State
boundaries, neither do its standardized products. The laws of
the machine operate the same everywhere; its uses, its dangers
when in use, its regulation by law, are, and should be, the same
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everywhere. Businesses grow up through machine use and
cooperation in the several States that frequently compete with
one another, and are regulated by one State but not by another.
Federal laws cannot reach so-called intra-state or reserved
affairs, hence cooperative State endeavors are necessary, either
through or apart from the method of the inter-state compact,
but at least by uniform legislation. In other words, the spread
of machine culture called for uniformity of legal regulation, not
only of the machine's use, but of all the myriad of relation-
ships of modern activity directly or indirectly due to the
machine's presence. Some of these uniform laws, more than
others, directly and specifically related to machine development.
A uniform negotiable instruments law furthered commerce, and
of course commerce was an indispensable prerequisite for per-
petuation of machine-age culture. The proposed uniform State
law for aeronautics is highly pertinent in this connection, as
well as those proposed for the sale and purchase of firearms, use
of automobiles, etc.
The movement to restate the basic common law principles
as found in court opinions, was primarily concerned with bring-
ing unity and harmony of viewpoint among the forty-eight
jurisdictions so far as judicial law was involved. But a deeper
motive was probably also present, namely, to remove from our
machine civilization the incubus of numerous conflicting deci-
sions merely because artificial governmental units, unknown to
business, existed in a federal union where, instead of one
supreme judicial tribunal for legal questions, there were forty-
eight, each with its own legal doctrines and viewpoints as to
what the law of common principles was or ought to be. Thus
in both uniform statutory, and uniform judicial doctrine move-
ments, we have witnessed in America attempts to bring
coherency and unity into legal regulations, to furnish fresh
starting-points in advancing machine culture, because of the
inability of the central government, under constitutional
inhibitions, to furnish the necessary legal uniformity. Owing
to the fact that in human relations nothing is static, or long so
remains, it has been questioned by some whether or not these
two uniform urges will occomplish their objectives, for in both
statutory enactment and judicial formulation, there will be
interpretation and construction in concrete issues, leading to a
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gloss of judicial pigmentation where, once again, variety and
diversity will originate themselves. But however this may be,
the important point is that a fresh starting point has been made
by both movements, and this is decidedly worth while in main-
tenance and furtherance of machine culture, where certainty
and assurance of legal operation are most desirable.
Closely allied to the uniformity in law movement is the
trend toward federalism, not only in Congressional invasion of
intra-state affairs through statutory enactment, but also in
judicial decision on the part primarily of the Federal Supreme
Court. A philosophy of centralization in the interests of trade
and commerce and therefore the machine, has dominated, and
still dominates, our legal or constitutional thinking; pragmatic
considerations of uniformity, unity and ease of administration,
and furtherance of nation-wide business, play the leading roles,
with federal governmental structure acting largely as emer-
gency brakes. Are we creating in our constitutional doctrines
and analyses, principles of expediency for machine culture,
which will ebb and flow as a majority of judicial personnel
come and go in national development? Governmental urging
to cooperation in agriculture, transportation, and petroleum,
may make for further friendly treatment in judicial decisions
where issues of unduly large-scale business practices and statu-
tory prohibitory enactments or complaints of competitors
present themselves.
IMPROVING MIACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE
It is, of course, unsound to attribute to one single factor
at any point in the stream of history various social develop-
ments. This is equally true with regard to the reactions of the
machine-age upon legal developments, and particularly those
movements in American legal thought relating to reform of
governmental structure and the methods according to which it
operates. But thus far, during the twentieth century, hundreds
of amendments to the Federal Constitution alone have been
proposed, many dealing with the fabric of government only,
on the general theory that our governmental machinery was
unsuited in some of its phases for machine culture; that it might
have functioned quite well for the ox-cart stage, but not for the
high-powered machine age of the present. In my judgment, the
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presence of the machine, making for quick access to all parts
of the American continent, the urge to speed and efficiency
inaugurated by machine methods, have been the real motif
behind many of these proposals. The same can be said of
reforms urged in judicial procedure, court organization, com-
mercial arbitration, and administrative law developments. We
need speed, certainly, and enlightened concepts in business
dealings above all, if not in all, justiciable problems. With the
right sort of governmental and judicial machinery, it is prob-
able that astounding results could be achieved in disposition of
the duties of government and the settlement of justiciable con-
troversies. By analyzing governmental structure, disassembling
it and seeing how it may be improved, we perform not only the
inestimable work of the legal scientist, but also that of the
social engineer; by engaging in the program of judicial reform
in all its phases, as represented by the American Judicature
Society and the American Law Institute, and by research pro-
grams in our higher university law schools, we further the
highest duty of man on earth, the administration of justice. But
in this process, we are part of a machine-age that wants results
and is impatient with obsolete forms of government and out-
worn judicial technique. In other words, we must adjust these
social or legal devices to the requirements of a machine civiliza-
tion.
More adequately to train the future leaders of the legal
profession in America, and at the same time to give them a
truer picture of law as life unfolds it, thus enabling them better
to succeed at the bar, some of us are throwing the spotlight of
criticism on the content and arrangement of our legal curricular
studies, as well as devising means to make the future lawyer,
judge, and legislator a more independent, creative legal thinker.
Thus we desire to enrich our legal curricula in the universities
by introducing legal studies with reference to industrial
problems, the judicial process, governmental structure, scientific
crime detection, and various legal clinics.16 The fact that the
manner of instruction, the content of legal materials in uni-
versity study, and the attitude toward legal principles became
1'OLeon Green, "A New Program in Legal Education," American
Bar Association Journal, May, 1930; Albertsworth, "The Science of
Governmental Structure and Function-A New Legal Study," Amer-
ican Law School Review, May, 1931.
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fixed before the machine age hit its stride, should make us pause
and inquire whether or not now improvement cannot be made,
but that which was good of the older system kept and used to
greater advantage. Life does not stand still; many factors
enter into the web of legal life; constant improvement should
be made in organized legal study, with no predilection for any
particular pedagogic.
IS A .AcHINE JURISPRUDENCE DEVELOPING?
Others have pointed out how our industrial age is develop-
ing an industrial jurisprudence, much as the Law Merchant,
centuries ago, grew out of customs and usages of merchants in
trade.17 Dean Pound has also familiarized the American legal
profession with a "mechanical jurisprudence,',' 8 which arose
from the judiciary applying legal principles in an abstract
fashion, without regard to concrete considerations and actual
working out of the rules as applied. That type of thinking
came from common law training, without consideration on the
part of the judiciary of the great changes that had occurred in
our civilization. The machine jurisprudence which it is believed
is now developing, arises largely out of industrial injury rela-
tionships, a vast field of law, through its ramifications of com-
mon law, workmen's compensation, federal employers' liability,
admiralty and maritime schemes of relief for personal harms
to workingmen. Perhaps this attitude of legal mind is present
also in other judicial fields. But before the machine's advent,
with the absence of conditions in industry making for a vast
number of personal harms, tort principles were applied in rigid
and unyielding fashion, to their "drily logical extremes." But
when the era of mechanical contrivances developed, where the
machine when in use greatly increased the number of personal
harms, we found our doctrinal repertoire lacking. With statu-
tory aid, largely of pre-existing judge-made rules, certain
principles were added, particularly abolition of assumption of
risk, allowing recovery for harms sustained "arising out of and
in the course of" the employment, imposition of liability with-
"' Ernst, "Development of Industrial Jurisprudence," 21 Columbia
Law Review, 155; Tufts, "Judicial Lawmaking Exemplified in Indus-
trial Arbitration," 21 Columbia Law Review, 405.
' Roscoe Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia Law Re-
view (1908), p. 605.
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out fault, etc. Since 1910, when workmen's compensation
relief as an industrial injury scheme made its American debut,
our courts have been busily engaged in developing a machine
jurisprudence through the construction not only of the
statutory principles laid down, but also in so liberalizing these
principles as in effect to create others. Administering justice
within a maze of legal doctrines and formulae is a decidedly
intricate task; and it may rightfully be said that he who
operates a business where the machine plays so necessary and
hazardous a part, ought to be legally liable for personal harms
received in the employ, barring willful or self-inflicted injuries,
because of the general principle that no one should profit by his
own wrong. The fact that the business is insured against such
risk, the fact that the injured or deceased employee cannot him-
self bear the burden of injury and death as well as the employer
in his superior position; the impersonal relations between
employer and employee in large-scale businesses; the great
number of these personal harms sustained-these seem to be
becoming the real basic principles of a machine jurisprudence,
due to the omnipresence of the machine and its hazardous
character when in use.19
While machine jurisprudence appears most clearly in
industrial injury relationships, where, instead of logical
analyses, broad humanitarian doctrines are being practiced by
commissions and courts in their opinions, nonetheless the
machine's presence can also be credited with creating the
"family purpose" doctrine in automobile liability; in statutory
requirements providing some sort of insurance or money
guarantee as a condition precedent to obtaining a license to
operate an automobile; the imposition of stringent legal liability
upon aircraft carriers, which have not yet met the searching
scrutiny of the courts ;20 the refusal to sanction statutory exemp-
tions of liability for personal harm inflicted by railroads; the
zoning of radio broadcasting and allocation of wave lengths;
and restrictions as well as locations of businesses harmful to the
public welfare, under broad principles of the "police power."
The proposed "unit plan" of cooperative action in the oil
"These developments in case material are ilustrated in my "Cases
on Industrial Law," pp. 96 et seq.
'John C. Cooper, Jr., "Aircraft Liability to Persons and Property
on Ground," 17 American Bar Association Journal, p. 435.
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industry due to excessive output by machine methods and com-
mon-law idea of property in oil, are forcing new ideas of the
nature of property.21 The use of the airplane over lands of
others is also changing our property concepts. All these
developments were not present in the law antecedent to the
machine; when they did make their appearance in America,
constitutional principles were strained to the utmost, and con-
tinual employment of "police power" and "implied" Powers
was made. They are with us now as part and parcel of our legal
fabric.
CONCLUSION
There are likely other legal tendencies attributable to
machine culture that may not now be discernible, and their
presence may affect other human relationships in turn. The fact
that the laws of mechanics operate inexorably and relentlessly,
once was partly, if not largely, responsible for a mechanical
cosmology, and a theism that culminated in skepticism. In the
popular mind, positive law may also be thus regarded; what-
ever does not work pragmatically, does not fit into the scheme
of natural human things, is not law, and need not be obeyed.
But more recent thinking in philosophy and science abandons
mechanism in metaphysics, perhaps because of the influence of
radio-activity and newer biological discoveries, and substitutes
a more flexible, dynamic conception of continuous creation. So
in our machine civilization. While this form of human culture
is spreading-the East is taking it from the West, Communism
from Capitalism-nonetheless it is not a super-civilization, and
has its limitations. The important point is that, as lawyers and
jurists, we live in a machine culture that may be vitally affecting
our thinking, and certainly our practice. How to use this age
of machinery for the law's best ends, and how to use the law for
the machine's legitimate purposes, are two related problems,
resolvable in the higher embracing conception of the further-
ance of the general welfare.
EDWIN F. ALBERTSWORTH.
"Various discussions on this problem are to be found by Messrs.
Nyce, German, and Oliver, in the May, June, and August (1931) num-
bers of the American Bar Association Journal.
